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CASE COMMENT
LEGALITY OF THE THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS: ENVIRONMENTAL AND
HUMANITARIAN LIMITS ON SELF-DEFENSE
I. INTRODUcrION
In its recent opinion, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,
the International Court ofJustice (ICJ) considered the legality of nu-
clear weapons in the context of environmental law and the law of
armed conflict.' The United Nations General Assembly (General As-
sembly) had requested an advisory opinion on the issue, "Is the threat
or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under inter-
national law?"2 In response to the General Assembly's request, the
Court unanimously agreed on three of five "subholdings."3 Despite
1 35 I.L.M. 814 (1996). The International Court ofJustice is the principle judi-
cial organ of the United Nations. It was established in 1945 by the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031. The Court consists of
fifteen members, including a President and Vice President.
2 GA. Res. 75 K, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., at 15, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/75 (1995).
3 First, the Court decided, thirteen votes to one, to "comply with the request for
an advisory opinion." Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 35 I.L.M.
814, 831 (1996). Second, the Court unanimously held that "It]ihere is in neither cus-
tomary nor conventional international law any specific authorization of the threat or
use of nuclear weapons." Id. at 831. Third, the Court held by eleven votes to three
that "[t] here is in neither customary nor conventional international law any compre-
hensive and universal prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons as such."
Id. Fourth, the Court unanimously held that "[a] threat or use of force by means of
nuclear weapons that is contrary to Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations
Charter and that fails to meet all the requirements of Article 51, is unlawful." Id.
Fifth, the Court unanimously held that:
A threat or use of nuclear weapons should also be compatible with the re-
quirements of the international law applicable in armed conflict, particularly
those of the principles and rules of international humanitarian law, as well as
with specific obligations under treaties and other undertakings which ex-
pressly deal with nuclear weapons.
Id.
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general agreement on the subholdings, the Court split seven to seven
on its main holding, with President Bedjaoui casting the deciding
vote.
4
[T] he threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary
to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in
particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law;
However, in view of the current state of international law, and the
elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude defini-
tively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful
or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which
the very survival of a State would be at stake.5
The first part of the holding was generally accepted by the Court. The
second part of the holding, in which the Court refused to decide the
legality of using nuclear weapons in a case of extreme self-defense,
was the major point of dissent.
In arriving at its holding, the Court considered three potentially
controlling areas of international law: human rights (including the
right to life and the prohibition against genocide), environmental law,
and the law of armed conflict. The Court found that the human
rights norm guaranteeing that "[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived
of his life," 6 must, during wartime, be analyzed under the law of
armed conflict.7 It then found that international law prohibiting ge-
nocide would forbid the use of nuclear weapons if the intent to de-
stroy human groups were present. In the absence of facts that could
lead to a showing of intent, however, the prohibition of genocide did
not control.
8
Turning next to environmental law, the Court cited Additional
Protocol I of 1977 to the Geneva Convention of 1949 (Protocol I), the
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use
of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD), Principle 2 of
the Rio Declaration (Rio 2), and Principle 21 of the Stockholm Decla-
ration (Stockholm 21). 9 Protocol I ° and ENMOD" prohibit means
4 "In the event of an equality of votes, the President... shall have a casting vote."
Statute of the International Court ofJustice, June 26, 1945, art. 55(2), 59 Stat. 1031,
1062.
5 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 35 I.L.M. at 831.
6 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 6, GA.
Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
7 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 35 I.L.M. at 820.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 820-21.
10 Protocol Additional (No. I) to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977,
art. 35(3), 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1409 [hereinafter Protocol I].
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of warfare or weapons that cause widespread or severe effects on the
environment. Rio 212 and Stockholm 2113 declare the duty of States
not to cause transboundary environmental harm. The Court ques-
tioned whether these rules and principles apply as obligations of total
restraint during wartime. In answering this question, it made two im-
portant statements concerning international environmental law. First,
the Court recognized the substance of Rio 2 and Stockholm 21 as cus-
tomary international law.' 4 Second, the Court considered environ-
mental law when analyzing the humanitarian principles of necessity
and proportionality.' 5 Though the Court decided that the issue was
governed by the law of armed conflict, it encompassed environmental
concerns in its analysis.
The Court then analyzed the issue under the international law of
armed conflict. The relevant principles in the Court's analysis in-
cluded those found in humanitarian law, self-defense doctrine, and
the principle of neutrality. Analyzing the issue with respect to these
principles, the Court arrived at its holding.
This Comment addresses two areas in which the Court's decision
could significantly affect international law. First, the Comment exam-
ines the Court's recognition of the duty not to cause transboundary
harm as customary law and the inclusion of environmental concerns
in necessity and proportionality analysis. Second, the Comment ex-
amines the treatment of nuclear weapons under humanitarian law,
specifically the interaction of humanitarian protections and self-de-
fense. It should be noted that this case presents other significant in-
ternational law issues, such as the Court's increased utilization of soft
11 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Envi-
ronmental Modification Techniques, May 18, 1977, art. 1(1), 31 U.S.T. 333, 336, 16
I.L.M. 88, 91 [hereinafter ENMOD].
12 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, June 13, 1992, principle 2,
31 I.L.M. 874, 876 [hereinafter Rio Declaration].
13 Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Envi-
ronment, June 16, 1972, principle 21, 11 I.L.M. 1416, 1420 [hereinafter Stockholm
Declaration].
14 "The existence of the general obligation of States to ensure that activities
within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other States or of
areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus of international law relating
to the environment." Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 35 I.L.M.
814, 821 (1996).
15 "Respect of the environment is one of the elements that go to assessing
whether an action is in conformity with the principles of necessity and proportional-
ity." Id.
1279
1280 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW [VOL. 72:4
law,16 the Court's application of Lotus to authorize or prohibit interna-
tional conduct, 17 and the increased role before the Court of the pri-
vate sector and non-governmental organizations.' In order to more
fully develop the environmental and humanitarian law implications,
this Comment does not explore the other issues.
Part II of the Comment discusses the Court's analysis in Legality of
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons. Part III examines the implications
of the opinion on environmental and humanitarian law. The Com-
ment concludes that the Court provided further evidence of the inter-
national customary duty not to cause transboundary harm. It also
concludes that the Court recognized environmental law, through ne-
cessity and proportionality, as a limit to the right to self-defense.
Turning to humanitarian law, the Comment concludes that the fail-
ure of the Court to clearly limit self-defense with humanitarian law
could lead to the erosion of humanitarian protections generally.
II. LEGALITY OF THE THREAT OR USE OF NucLEAR WEAPONS
On the same day that the International Court of Justice refused
to give an advisory opinion on a similar request from the World
Health Organization (WHO), 19 the Court issued an advisory opinion
on substantively the same question posed by the General Assembly.
The General Assembly resolution asked the Court: "Is the threat or
use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under interna-
tional law?"20 The Court reasoned that it was jurisdictionally permit-
16 The Court relied extensively on non-binding case law throughout its opinion.
See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 35 I.L.M. 814, passim (1996).
For example, in examining the legal nature of the issue, the Court cited eleven I.CJ.
advisory opinions. See id. at 817-18. Throughout its opinion, the Court also relied on
several General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. See, e.g., id. at 822-23,
826-28.
17 See discussion infra Part IIA.
18 See Dinah Shelton, The Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in
International Judicial Proceedings, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 611 (1994).
19 The World Health Organization (WHO) requested that the Court respond to
the question, "In view of the health and environmental effects, would the use of nu-
clear weapons by a State in war or other armed conflict be a breach of its obligations
under international law including the WHO Constitution?" WHA 46.40 (May 14,
1993). By a margin of eleven votes to three, the Court decided to refuse to grant the
opinion on the grounds that it did not have proper jurisdiction. Legality of the Use
by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, I.CJ. (July 8, 1996) (visited Feb. 23,
1997) <http://www.mdfait-maeci.gc.ca/english/foreignp/disarm/icj/whopinio. txt>.
The Court ruled that the question did not arise within the scope of the activities of
the WHO and was therefore precluded from granting the opinion by the Charter of
the United Nations. Id.
20 GA. Res. 75 K, supra note 2, at 16.
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ted to grant an advisory opinion on a legal question presented by the
General Assembly.21 Upon finding the question to be a valid legal
question, and noting no compelling reasons for refusal, the Court ex-
ercised its discretion to grant the opinion.
22
A. Pre-existing Norms and Lotus
In the initial stages of its analysis, the Court noted some States'
objection to the language of the inquiry. Some States argued that by
asking whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons was permitted by
international law, the question assumed that the threat or use of nu-
clear weapons would be illegal without such permission. As an alter-
native phrasing, these States requested that the word permitted be
replaced with the word prohibited.
In support, these States quoted dictum from the 1927 case S.S.
Lotus.23 "'[RIestrictions upon the independence of States can-
not... be presumed' and... international law leaves to the States 'a
wide measure of discretion which is only limited in certain cases by
21 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 35 I.L.M. at 818.
22 Id. at 819. The Court first noted that compelling reasons were necessary to
dissuade it from granting an advisory opinion within its jurisdiction. Id. at 818. The
Court then noted that only once did the Permanent Court of International Justice
refuse to grant opinion based on discretion. In Status of Eastern Carelia, 1923 P.C.I.J.
(ser. B) No. 5 (July 23), that Court refused a discretionary opinion when, concerning
an existing dispute, "one of the States . .. was neither party to the Statute of the
Permanent Court, [was not] a member of the League of Nations, [and] refused to
take part in any way." Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 35 I.L.M. at 818.
States that opposed the Court deciding the issue offered potentially "compelling rea-
sons" to refuse discretion such as: no dispute existed (the question was vague and
abstract); the opinion would give no practical assistance to the United Nations in
carrying out its Charter; there existed a potential to undermine progress made in the
area of nuclear disarmament; and the opinion would constitute an improper legisla-
tive act. Id. The Court rejected these reasons, with the following responses: an advi-
sory opinion does not require an actual dispute (the question may be abstract); the
General Assembly may determine the usefulness of the opinion; the opinion would
provide an additional element in disarmament negotiations, but would not under-
mine such negotiations; and the judiciary may apply existing legal principles, includ-
ing stating the scope and trend of such principles-this action did not constitute a
legislative act. Id. at 819.
23 S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.IJ. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7). In Lotus, the
French and Turkish governments made a special agreement referring to the Perma-
nent Court of InternationalJustice the question whether Turkey had acted in conflict
with the principles of international law in assuming jurisdiction over an officer of a
French vessel on the high seas. The Court determined that Turkey had not violated
international law.
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prohibitive rules."' 24 The States used the Lotus dictum to argue that
"States are free to threaten or use nuclear weapons unless it can be
shown that they are bound not to do so by reference to a prohibition
in either treaty law or customary international law."25 The Court
could have addressed the issue of whether the existing norm in inter-
national law was a prohibition or authorization of the threat or use of
nuclear weapons. Using this norm as a basis, the Court could have
searched for international law contravening that norm. Instead, the
Court chose to bypass the issue, noting that all the States agreed (or at
least did not dispute) that "their independence to act
was . . . restricted by the principles and rules of international law,
more particularly humanitarian law."26 Thus, the Court introduced
the Lotus dictum in detail but chose to ignore its application as "with-
out particular significance for the disposition of the issues before the
Court."
2 7
B. Determination of Applicable Law
The Court next evaluated three areas of international law as po-
tentially relevant to the resolution of the issue: human rights (the
right to life and the prohibition against genocide), environmental law,
and the law of armed conflict.
1. Human Rights-The Right to Life and the Prohibition Against
Genocide
The Court first considered the international law principle of the
right to life. "Every human being has the inherent right to life. This
right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of
24 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 35 I.L.M. at 819 (quoting S.S.
Lotus, 1927 P.C.IJ. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18-19 (Sept. 7)). The Court also noted dicta
from Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.): "in international law there are
no rules, other than such rules as may be accepted by the State concerned, by treaty
or otherwise, whereby the level of armaments of a sovereign State can be limited." Id.
(quoting Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.CJ. 14, 135 (June
27)).
25 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 35 I.L.M. at 819. The continued
applicability of the Lotus dicta has been questioned. SeeJonathan I. Charney, Universal
International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 529 (1993); Mark Allen Gray, The International
Crime of Ecocide, 26 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 215,237 (1996); Franz Xaver Perrez, The Relation-
ship Between "Permanent Sovereignty" and the Obligation Not to Cause Transboundary Dam-
age 25 ENvTL. L. 1187 (1996).
26 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 35 I.L.M. at 820.
27 Id.
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his life."28 Concluding that the right to life exists in war as well as
peacetime, the Court determined that the test of arbitrary deprivation
of life in wartime must be determined according to the international
law of armed conflict.
29
Next, the Court applied the definition contained in the Genocide
Convention. The Convention defined genocide as follows:
[a]ny of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as
such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calcu-
lated to being [sic] about its physical destruction in whole or in
part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another
group.30
The Court determined that the prohibition against genocide would
be pertinent to the intentional threat or use of nuclear weapons. Not-
ing, however, that intent is a necessary element, the Court ruled that it
was unable to apply the rule due to the absence of specific facts. Rea-
soning that the right to life during wartime was absorbed by the law of
armed conflict and the prohibition against genocide was inapplicable
without specific facts, the Court next turned to environmental law.
2. Environmental Law
In considering environmental law, the Court cited two treaties
and two declarations. The Court first cited Protocol I, prohibiting the
employment of "methods or means of warfare which are intended, or
may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage
to the natural environment."31 The Court next introduced a similar
provision in ENMOD which prohibited the use of weapons which have
"'widespread, long-lasting, or severe effects' on the environment."32
Turning to soft law documents, the Court then noted the common
28 Id (quoting the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra
note 6, art. 6) (emphasis added).
29 Id.
30 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting the Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, art. 2, 78 U.N.T.S. 227, 230).
31 Id. (quoting Protocol I, supra note 10, art. 35(3)).
32 Id. at 821 (quoting ENMOD, supra note 11, art. 1(1)).
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principle of Rio 2 and Stockholm 21. "States ... have a duty 'to en-
sure that activities within their jurisdiction and control do not cause
damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction."' 33 The States that opposed these four
precedents did so on many bases including: certain States were not
parties to the treaties or had made reservations before signing the
treaties; nuclear weapons were not addressed in the treaties; the trea-
ties and declarations applied during peacetime only; and application
of the treaties and declarations to nuclear weapons would be destabi-
lizing to international law.3
In response to the objections, the Court made two statements
about environmental law. First, in response to States claiming that
either they were not parties to the treaties or that the declarations
were not binding, the Court declared that the duty not to cause trans-
boundary harm was customary international law. 35 Second, in re-
sponse to States claiming that this duty did not apply in wartime, the
Court responded by evaluating whether the customary duty was one of
total restraint during wartime.36 The Court recognized that respect
for the environment was an element considered when evaluating ne-
cessity and proportionality in self-defense.
The Court does not consider that the treaties in question could
have intended to deprive a State of the exercise of its right of
selfdefence under international law because of its obligations to
protect the environment. Nonetheless, States must take environ-
mental considerations into account when assessing what is necessary
and proportionate in the pursuit of legitimate military objectives.
Respect for the environment is one of the elements that go to assessing whether
an action is in conformity with the principles of necessity and
proportionality.
37
33 Id. (quoting Rio Declaration, supra note 12, principle 2).
34 Id.
35 "The existence of the general obligation of States to ensure that activities
within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other States or of
areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus of international law relating to the
environment." Id. (emphasis added).
36 Id.
37 Id. (emphasis added). The Court supplied support for this proposition in hard
and soft law. The Court quoted Principle 24 of the Rio Declaration: "Warfare is inher-
ently destructive of sustainable development. States shall therefore respect interna-
tional law providing protection for the environment in times of armed conflict and
cooperate in its further development, as necessary." Id. (quoting Rio Declaration,
supra note 12, principle 24). The Court also cited G.A. Res. 37, U.N. GAOR, 47th
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/37 (1994), in support of the proposition that wartime
destruction of the environment when not justified by military necessity was unlawful
under international law.
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With this statement the Court drew a balance between the right to
self-defense and the duty to respect the environment.
C. Application of the Law of Armed Conflict
Concluding that the law of armed conflict and nuclear weapons
treaties were the most directly applicable law, the Court first ex-
amined the Charter of the United Nations (U.N. Charter), especially
the articles pertaining to the legal use of force and self-defense. The
Court then addressed potentially applicable nuclear weapons treaties.
Next, the Court explored customary international law for a prohibi-
tion or authorization of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. Finally,
the Court examined, humanitarian law and the principle of neutrality.
1. The U.N. Charter
After discussing the unique destructive capacity of nuclear weap-
ons, the Court examined the use of force provision of the U.N. Char-
ter: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with
the Purposes of the United Nations."38 Article 51, the self-defense
provision of the U.N. Charter, contains an exception to this prohibi-
tion.3 9 The Court noted some limitations to the right to self-defense.
38 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nudear Weapons, 35 I.L.M. at 822 (quoting the U.N.
CHARTER, art. 2, para. 4). Article 2, paragraph 4 applies equally to the threat and use
of force. The Court explained:
The notions of "threat" and "use" of force under Article 2, paragraph 4, of
the Charter stand together in the sense that if the use of force itself in a
given case is illegal-for whatever reason-the threat to use such force will
likewise be illegal. In short, if it is to be lawful, the declared readiness of a
State to use force must be a use of force that is in conformity with the
Charter.
Id. at 823.
The Court analyzed possession as a potential threat and concluded that whether
possession may be considered a threat depends upon:
[W]hether the particular use of force envisaged would be directed against
the territorial integrity or political independence of a State, or against the
Purposes of the United Nations or whether, in the event it where intended
as a means of defence, it would necessarily violate the principles of necessity
and proportionality.
Id.
39 SeeU.N. CHARTER, art. 51. Another lawful use of force mentioned by the Court
is addressed in the U.N. CHRTER, art. 42, by which the Security Council may take
military enforcement measures in conformity with Chapter VII of the Charter. The
Court did not analyze such a use of force since it considered it outside the scope of
1285
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First, any self-defense use of force must in fact be an act of self-de-
fense. Second, Article 51 requires that the defending State report all
measures taken to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such
action must not interfere with the Security Council's ability to take
action to maintain or restore international peace. Third, the self-de-
fense measures must meet the customary international law principles
of necessity and proportionality.40
Opponents of nuclear weapons argued that proportionality is im-
possible in the case of nuclear weapons due to the unique destructive
capabilities of such weapons.41 The Court responded that proportion-
ality did not itself exclude the use of nuclear weapons, but any propor-
tionality analysis must consider the unique aspects of nuclear
weapons. The analysis must consider the destructive capacity of nu-
clear weapons, the heat and energy output, the radiation released, the
risk of escalation, and the associated potential to destroy the entire
ecosystem and human civilization. 42 Thus, the Court recognized the
possibility of a lawful threat or use of nuclear weapons under Article
51 of the U.N. Charter; contingent upon the threat or use meeting
necessity and proportionality requirements. While these standards
might, in the case of nuclear weapons, be difficult or impossible to
attain, they do not make the threat or use of nuclear weapons per se
unlawful.
2. Nuclear Weapons Treaties
The Court next turned to specific treaties to ascertain whether
the threat or use of nuclear weapons was per se prohibited or author-
ized by such treaties. The Court first determined that poison weapons
treaties did not apply to nuclear weapons because States understand
such treaties to include only weapons whose prime or exclusive effect
is to poison or asphyxiate. 43 Next, the Court considered nuclear trea-
ties addressing the acquisition, manufacture, possession, deployment,
the presented issue. The Court also did not address the threat or use of nuclear
weapons within a State's own boundaries.
40 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 35 I.L.M. at 822; see Military and
Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 94 (June 27).
41 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 35 I.L.M. at 822.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 824. The poison weapons provisions and treaty rejected by the Court
include: the Convention With Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July
29, 1899, art. 23(a), 32 Stat. 1803, 1817, 187 Consol. T.S. 429, 438 [hereinafter Hague
Convention (II) of 1899]; the Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War
on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 23(a), 36 Stat. 2277, 2301, 205 Consol. T.S. 277, 293
[hereinafter Hague Convention (IV) of 1907]; and the Protocol for the Prohibition of
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and testing of nuclear weapons. The Court concluded that such trea-
ties pointed to an increasing concern about nuclear weapons in the
international community, possibly even a foreshadowing of a general
prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. But since none of the trea-
ties cited covered use, the Court considered them inapplicable to the
threat or use of nuclear weapons. 44
Three treaties discussed by the Court do address the use of nu-
clear weapons. First, the Treaty of Tlatelolcot directly prohibits the
threat or use of nuclear weapons in Latin America. Second, the
Treaty of Rarotonga 6 indirectly prohibits the threat or use of nuclear
weapons in the South Pacific. Third, the Treaty on the Non-Prolifera-
tion of Nuclear Weapons,47 signed by the five nuclear weapon States,
provides positive and negative assurances against the use of nuclear
weapons. In all three treaties, some or all of the nuclear weapon
States reserved the right to resort to the use of nuclear weapons. Op-
ponents of nuclear weapons pointed to the regional and local treaties
as evidence of the emergence of an international rule of complete
prohibition by law of all uses of nuclear weapons.48 The States argu-
ing that nuclear weapon use may be legal in some circumstances con-
tended that acceptance of the possession of nuclear weapons by the
five States was tantamount to recognizing that they. may be used in
certain circumstances. The Court pointed to the reservations con-
tained inthe treaties:
[A] number of States have undertaken not to use nuclear weapons
in specific zones . . . or against certain other States ....
[N]evertheless, even within this framework, the nuclearweapon
States have reserved the right to use nuclear weapons in certain cir-
cumstances; and these reservations met with no objection from the
parties [to the treaties] or from the Security Council.49
Analyzing these treaties, the Court concluded that they did not pro-
vide a universal prohibition on the threat or use of nuclear weapons.50
the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological
Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571.
44 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 35 I.L.M. at 824.
45 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, Feb. 14,
1967, 6 I.L.M. 521.
46 The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, Aug. 5, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 1440.
47 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T.
483, 729 U.N.T.S. 169 [hereinafter NPT]. The five nuclear weapon States are China,
France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
48 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 35 I.L.M. at 825.
49 Id. at 826.
50 Id.
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Finding that the threat or use of nuclear weapons was not per se pro-
hibited by treaty, the Court next examined customary international
law for a per se authorization or prohibition.
3. Customary International Law
After finding no per se prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear
weapons in treaties, the Court turned to customary international law.
Mirroring its treaty analysis, the Court examined whether customary
international law provided a per se prohibition or authorization of the
threat or use of nuclear weapons. The Court adopted the universally
accepted formula for establishing customary international law: State
practice plus opiniojuris.51 The main state practice argument between
the States concerned non-use of nuclear weapons since World War II
and the cold war policy of deterrence. The Court found neither prac-
tice determinative on the question of customary international law.
Next, the Court considered General Assembly resolutions declaring
nuclear weapons illegal.52 The Court first noted that a series of reso-
lutions could be sufficient basis for establishing opiniojuris. The Court
noted, however, that the resolutions in question received a substantial
number of negative votes and abstentions, causing them to fall short
of opiniojuris. Thus, the Court found neither a conventional rule nor
a customary rule authorizing or prohibiting the threat or use of nu-
clear weapons per se.
51 Id. The two components necessary to form customary international law are
material and psychological in nature. State practice refers to the behavior of a State.
Opinio juris refers to the elusive psychological component-"what States think."
LAKSHMAN D. GURUSWAMY ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND WORLD
ORDER 80 (1994).
52 The Court cited General Assembly resolution GA. Res. 1653, U.N. GAOR, 16th
Sess, Supp. No. 17, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961), as the first of the "important series
of General Assembly resolutions," but did not list the subsequent resolutions. Legality
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 35 I.L.M. at 826. The Court noted that had a
customary international rule of law prohibiting the threat or use of nuclear weapons
existed when GA. Res. 1653 was passed, the resolution would have referred to that
rule of law, rather than applying past precedent in an attempt to qualify that law.
The Court's analysis of GA. Res. 1653 is an indication of the weight to be given
to a General Assembly resolution. Three conclusions may be drawn from the Court's
treatment of the resolution. First, a series of General Assembly resolutions can meet
the opiniojuris requirement of customary international law. Second, substantial nega-
tive votes and abstentions may block such opinio juris from forming. Third, when a
resolution incorporates precedent in an attempt to qualify a rule of law, that rule of
law may not yet be customary international law. If such a customary international rule
of law existed at the time of the resolution, a strong resolution would announce
rather than try to derive such a rule of law.
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4. Humanitarian Law and the Principle of Neutrality
Finding no per se prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear
weapons, the Court next evaluated the issue with regard to the hu-
manitarian law of armed conflict and the principle of neutrality.
a. Acceptance of the Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict
and the Principle of Neutrality
The Court noted that the States did not dispute the existence of
either the humanitarian law of anned conflict or the principle of neu-
trality. The Court broke down humanitarian law into two main princi-
ples: the prohibition against indiscriminate effects, and unnecessary
suffering. The opinion stated these principles as follows:
States must never make civilians the object of attack and must con-
sequently never use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing
between civilian and military targets.... [I] t is prohibited to cause
unnecessary suffering to combatants: it is accordingly prohibited to
use weapons causing them such harm or uselessly aggravating their
suffering.53
The Court stated that these principles were intransgressible prin-
ciples of customary international law and therefore applied to all
States.54 Rejecting the argument made by a few States that humanita-
53 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 35 I.L.M. at 827.
54 Id. The Court cites many sources establishing the customary nature of the
principles, including: the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, and the Geneva Con-
ventions of 1864, 1906, 1929, and 1949. Additionally, the Court quoted the Nurem-
berg International Military Tribunal of 1945 which found that the humanitarian rules
included in the Hague Convention (IV) of 1907 "were recognized by all civilized na-
tions and were regarded as being declaratory of the laws and customs of war." Legality
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 35 I.L.M. at 827 (quoting the TRIAL OF THE
MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BrORE THE INTERNATIONAL MrrARY TIBUNAL 254 (1947)).
Corfu Channel, 1949 IC.J. 4, also held that humanitarian law was customary interna-
tional law. For further support, the Court quoted the Martens Clause as stated in
Protocol I:
In cases not covered by this Protocol or by international agreements, civil-
ians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the prin-
ciples of international law derived from established custom, from the
principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience.
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 35 I.L.M. at 827 (quoting Protocol I,
supra note 10, art. 1(2)).
The Court's opinion utilized the Martens Clause to support the applicability of
humanitarian law to nuclear weapons, while the dissenting opinions of Judges
Shahabuddeen and Weeramantry used the Martens clause to support the per se pro-
hibition of nuclear weapons. The dissenting judges argued that weapons of such
unique destructive capacity could not be used in accordance with the dictates of pub-
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rian law did not apply to nuclear weapons since such weapons were
invented after the principles were established, the Court further held
that humanitarian principles applied to the threat or use of nuclear
weapons.55
The Court stated the principle of neutrality in this way "[t]he ter-
ritory of neutral powers is inviolable."56 The Court then gave several
variants of the principle and stated that the principle was an estab-
lished part of customary international law.57 As the Court noted, the
fact that humanitarian law and the principle of neutrality apply to nu-
clear weapons was largely not in controversy. The controversial aspect
of the issue was the application of the principles to the threat or use of
nuclear weapons.
b. Application of the Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict
and the Principle of Neutrality
In applying the principles of humanitarian law and neutrality, the
Court did not conduct extensive balancing and analysis. Rather, it
stated the relative positions of States who argued that nuclear weapon
use might be legal in some circumstances and States who argued that
the threat or use of nuclear weapons was unlawful in all circum-
stances. The States proposing legality in some circumstances argued
that the threat or use of nuclear weapons might be lawful in two in-
stances: in self-defense and in the case of a low yield tactical nuclear
weapon. These States proposed that a nuclear weapon might meet
the self-defense limitations of necessity and proportionality. In self-
defense or otherwise, the States also argued that a low yield nuclear
weapon might be used without significant civilian casualties. 58 The
States holding the view that the use of nuclear weapons would always
be illegal argued that nuclear weapons were largely uncontrollable in
time and space and in all circumstances would indiscriminately inflict
lic conscience. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 35 I.L.M. at 871-73
(dissenting opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen); id. at 900-01 (dissenting opinion of
Judge Weeramantry).
55 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 35 IL.M. at 828. The Court again
cited the Martens Clause in support of its position. Id.
56 Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons
in Case of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 1, 36 Stat. 2310, 2322, 205 Consol. T.S.
299, 300.
57 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 35 I.L.M. at 827.
58 Id. at 829. The scenarios envisioned include attacks against ships on the high
seas or against military targets in sparsely populates areas.
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civilian casualties, violating principles of humanitarian law and
neutrality.59
After listing the positions of the competing States, the Court first
ruled that it had insufficient evidence regarding the use of nuclear
weapons, the effects of tactical nuclear weapons, and the probability
of escalation to determine whether the threat or use of nuclear weap-
ons could be legal in a particular circumstance. Acknowledging that
nuclear weapons were generally incompatible with the law of armed
conflict, the Court stated that it was unable to make the determina-
tion that the threat or use of nuclear weapons was illegal in all circum-
stances. 6° The Court then stated that the use of nuclear weapons
seemed scarcely reconcilable with respect for humanitarian law and
the principle of neutrality. Withdrawing, however, the Court noted
that it did not have the specific facts necessary to determine that the
use of nuclear weapons could never conform to such principles.61
This analysis led to the Court's first major holding: "[T]he threat or
use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of
international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the
principles and the rules of humanitarian law."
62
Next, the Court acknowledged a State's right to survival and self-
defense as a fundamental right. Considering the nature of the right
of self-defense and the reservations made by nuclear weapon States in
regional treaties, the Court concluded in its second major holding
that it could not determine the legality of the use of nuclear weapons
in an extreme case of self-defense:
However, in view of the current state of international law, and of the
elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude defini-
tively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful
or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which
the very survival of a State would be at stake.
65
Thus the Court determined that it could not answer the question, "Is
the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted
under international law?"
Given the abstract nature of the advisory opinion request, the
Court determined that there existed no per se prohibition on the use
of nuclear weapons, identified the relevant principles under which an




62 Id. at 831.
63 Id.
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erally nuclear weapons would not conform with humanitarian law and
the principle of neutrality. It did suggest that the circumstance of ex-
treme self-defense could bear upon the issue. Beyond that, the Court
determined that it could not adequately answer the presented
question.
D. Promotion of Disarmament
The Court concluded its opinion with an appeal to States to con-
tinue good faith negotiations toward nuclear disarmament. The
Court pointed out that States have a legal obligation not only to pur-
sue negotiations but to conclude negotiations that bring about com-
plete nuclear disarmament under strict and effective international
control.
64
III. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT
A. Background
Environmental protection during war is both an old and a new
concept. The law of armed conflict has long contained rules that are
not environment specific, yet provide environmental protection.
More recently, environment-specific protections have been incorpo-
rated into the law of armed conflict. Peacetime environmental law
has also recently been recognized as a potential source for environ-
mental protection during war.
The law of armed conflict has historical roots in medieval times
when knights recognized a code of chivalry. Throughout history, the
prevailing view has been that sovereignties do not have unlimited dis-
cretion as to the means they may employ for injuring the enemy. Pro-
scriptions against harming civilians, plundering villages, or killing
captives have been historically recognized as applicable in war.65 The
codification of the laws of armed conflict in the late nineteenth and
64 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 35 I.L.M. at 830 (citing NPT, supra
-note 47, art. MV).
65 For an explanation of the origins and history of the law of armed conflict, see
L.C. GREEN, ESSAYS ON THE MODERN LAW OF WAR 83-102 (1985); HnIARE MCCOUBREY,
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: THE REGULATION OF ARMED CONFLICTS 6-19
(1990); Georges Abi-Saab, The Specificities of Humanitarian Law, in STUDIES AND ESSAYS
ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND RED CROSS PRINCIPLES 265, 273-80 (Chris-
tophe Swinarski ed., 1984); G.IAD. Draper, The Development ofInternational Humanita-
rian Law, in INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF HuMANITARIAN LAW 67, 67-86 (1988);
TELEFORD TAYLOR, Foreword to THE LAW OF WAR: A DocuMENTARY HISTORY-VoLUME 1
xiii, xiii-xxv (Leon Friedman ed., 1972). For the view that military necessity tran-
scends the laws and customs of law, see McCoUjmEv, supra note 65, at 198.
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twentieth centuries has resulted in two groups of rules: "Hague Law"
based on the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907; and "Geneva
Law" based on the Geneva Conventions of 1864, 1906, 1929, 1949 and
the Additional Protocols I and II of 1977.66 Both the Hague and Ge-
neva Conventions recognized the preexistence of rules of armed con-
flict. These conventions generally codified existing customary
international law but in some instances expanded upon such laws.
67
1. Non-Environment-Specific Protections in the Law of Armed
Conflict
The law of armed conflict has been codified in modem times
most notably in the 'Hague and Geneva Conventions.68 A basic pre-
cept of the law of armed conflict is that "[t]he right of belligerents to
adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited. '6 9 Hague and
Geneva law recognize four principles of limitation. Military necessity,
discrimination, prevention of unnecessary suffering, and proportion-
ality limit States' actions during war.70 These four principles have be-
come part of customary international law.71 While principles of
limitation do not expressly protect the environment, they could be
applied during 'war to provide environmental protection.
Military necessity requirements in Hague and Geneva law could
limit environmental harm during war. Article 23 of the Fourth Hague
Convention prohibits destruction of enemy property unless de-
manded by military necessity.72 Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Con-
66 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 35 I.L.M. at 827.
67 See GREEN, supra note 65, at 94.
68 The Geneva texts were drawn up solely for the benefits of war victims, while the
Hague texts regulate hostilities by granting States certain rights to the detriment of
individuals and by prohibiting certain State acts in war. Jean Pictet, Introduction: Inter-,
national Humanitarian Law: Definition, in INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF HuMANITA-
RAN LAW, supra note 65, at xix, xx. The terms Hague and Geneva law refer to the laws
codified in the various Hague and Geneva Conventions.
The treaties of most significance to this discussion are the Fourth Hague Conven-
tion, Hague Convention (IV) of 1907, supra note 43, and the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion, Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention
(IV) of 1949]; see infra Part IV.A.
69 Hague Convention (IV) of 1907, supra note 43, art. 22; see also Betsy Baker,
Legal Protections for the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict, 33 VA.J. INT'L L. 351, 360
(1993); GREEN, supra note 65, at 89.
70 See Richard Falk, The Environmental Law of War: An Introduction, in ENVRONMEN-
TA. PROTECTbON AND THE LAW OF WAR 78, 84 (Glen Plant ed., 1992); Baker, supra note
69, at 359.
71 See Falk, supra note 70, at 84.
72 Hague Convention (IV) of 1907, supra note 43, art. 23.
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vention contains a similar prohibition on occupying forces.73 Either
customary rule could limit transboundary environmental harm during
war.74
Similarly, Protocol I's prohibition against indiscriminate attacks on
civilians could provide environmental protection.75 Article 52(1) of
Protocol I prohibits attacks against non-military targets, including the
"natural environment."76 Protocol I does not define "natural environ-
ment," so doubt remains as to whether the environment can be given
civilian status under Article 52(1) or whether it is a military objective
under Article 52 (2).77 To the extent the environment can be assigned
civilian status, the prohibition against attacks on civilian objects could
provide a measure of environmental protection during war.
The prohibition against unnecessarj suffering has traditionally ad-
dressed the suffering of military personnel.78 To the extent that envi-
ronmental harm could cause such suffering, environmental
protection should be required. There has been a recent movement to
extend this protection to civilians.79 Such an extension would
broaden environmental protection under the principles of no unnec-
essary suffering.
Proportionality in war requires that a military action be propor-
tional to its desired results.8 0 Article 57(2) (a) of Protocol I requires
proportionality with respect to incidental civilian losses.8 ' Like mili-
tary necessity, proportionality should prohibit environmental damage
which exceeds military objectives.
The law of armed conflict contains provisions which do not di-
rectly protect the environment, yet should provide a measure of envi-
ronmental protection during war. Such provisions, while not specific
to the environment, carry strong customary international law status in
their general application. To the extent that the environment can be
73 Geneva Convention (IV) of 1949, supra note 68, art. 53.
74 The Court declared that the Hague and Geneva Conventions were customary
law, see supra text accompanying note 53. For a discussion countering the point that
military necessity always takes precedence over environmental concerns, see Baker,
supra note 69, at 362.
75 Protocol I, supra note 10, art. 52.
76 Id.
77 See Michael Bothe, Round Table Session II: Targetiy, in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEC-
TION AND THE LAW OF WAR, supra note 70, at 117, 117; Baker, supra note 69, at 364-65.
78 See Baker, supra note 69, at 365-66.
79 See id.
80 See id. at 367.
81 Protocol I, supra note 10, art. 57(2) (a).
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included in the general scope of such law, these provisions of the law
of armed conflict can provide environmental protection during war.
8 2
2. Specific Environmental Protections in the Law of Armed
Conflict
The law of armed conflict has more recently adopted specific en-
vironmental protections. Article 1 (1) of ENMOD prohibits weapons
causing "widespread, long lasting, or severe effects" on the environ-
ment.8 3 Likewise, Art 35(3) of Protocol I prohibits "methods or
means of warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to cause
widespread, long term and severe damage to the environment."8 4 Ar-
ticle 55(1) similarly prohibits widespread, long-term, and severe dam-
age to the environment.8 5 The ENMOD and Protocol I provisions are
helpful to environmental protection in that they specifically address
the environment in time of war. The provisions have, however, three
shortcomings. First, both ENMOD and Protocol I establish high
82 The Fourth Hague Convention contains other provisions which, though not
widely recognized as such, could provide environmental protection. Article 25 pro-
hibits attacks on undefended areas. Article 27 protects cultural monuments. Article
28 prohibits pillaging. Article 55 makes an occupying force the administrator of an
enemy's captured property and requires protection of such property. Hague Conven-
tion (IV) of 1907, supra note 43, arts. 25, 27, 28, 55.
For discussions of potential environmental protections in the law of armed con-
flict see Falk, supra note 70, at 78; Baker, supra note 61, at 351; Hans-Peter Gasser, For
Better Protection of the Natural Environment in Armed Conflict: A Proposal for Action, 89 AM.
J. INT'L L. 637 (1995); Neil A.F. Popovic, Humanitarian Law, Protection of the Environ-
ment, and Human Rights, 8 GEO. INT'L ENVrL. L. Ruv. 67 (1995). Richard Falk lists
several peripheral norms which, depending on the specific facts, could provide envi-
ronmental protection during war. See Falk, supra note 70, at 91-92.
83 ENMOD, supra note 11, art. 1(1).
84 Protocol I, supra note 10, art. 35(3).
85 Article 55 states:
1. Care shallbe taken in warfare to protect the natural environment
against widespread, longterm and severe damage. This protection includes
a prohibition of the use of methods or means of warfare which are intended
or may be expected to cause such damage to the natural environment and
thereby prejudice the health or survival of the population.
2. Attacks against the natural environment by way of reprisals are
prohibited.
Id. art. 55.
Other provisions of Protocol I which could provide environmental protection
include: Article 54 which prohibits methods of warfare designed to starve or displace
citizens by attacking indispensable objects; Article 55(5) prohibits the merging of mil-
itary targets in civilian areas; and Article 56 which prohibits attacks on non-military
dams, dykes and nuclear power plants if the attack might release dangerous forces
causing severe civilian losses. See id. arts. 54-56.
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thresholds for prohibited environmental damage during war. The en-
vironmental damage caused by most conventional weapons would not
rise to the level of wide-spread, long-term, and severe damage and
would therefore not be prohibited by the provisions. Second, the pro-
visions have only been in place since 1977 and lack the strong custom-
ary force of the older rules of armed conflict. 86 Third, "environment"
is not defined in either document, leaving the provisions somewhat
vague. While specific environmental protections in the law of armed
conflict have shortcomings, they stand as evidence of the trend to rec-
ognize environmental concerns in the law of armed conflict.
87
3. Peacetime Environmental Protections
The most applicable peacetime norm of international environ-
mental protection is the recently introduced duty not to cause trans-
boundary harm. This duty was first given form in Trail Smelter
Arbitration.88 In Trail Smelter, a special arbitral tribunal applied United
States and international law (as mandated by the governing treaty be-
tween the United States and Canada) in deciding that Canada was
liable to the United States for damage to Washington crops resulting
86 "It is uncertain whether an argument to the effect that Articles 35(3) or 55 are
now part of customary international law, or of the still more jurisprudentially suspect
category of 'general principles of international law', would succeed." Falk, supra note
70, at 89.
87 Another document prescribing environmental norms during war is the 1982
World Charter for Nature, GA. Res. 7, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 17,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/7 (1982), reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 455 (1983). Paragraph 5 of the
Charter states: "Nature shall be secured against degradation caused by warfare or
other hostile activities." Id. para. 5. Paragraph 11 is expressed in more general terms:
"Activities which might have an impact on nature shall be controlled, and the best
available technologies that minimize significant risks to nature or other adverse ef-
fects shall be used." Id. para. 11. The vote on the resolution was 111 States in favor,
18 abstentions, and only the United States opposed. The Charter's status as custom-
ary international law is more doubtful than that of Protocol I or ENMOD.
Article 2(4) of Protocol III to the 1980 Inhumane Weapons Convention extends
protection to forests and other natural cover. Convention on the Prohibition or Re-
strictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Apr. 10, 1981, in Final Report
of the Conference to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.95/15, Oct. 27, 1980,
Annex I, repinted in 19 I.L.M. 1523 (1980). Again, the Protocol's status as customary
law is doubtful.
Principle 24 of the Rio Declaration also could provide a diect source of environ-
mental protection during war. See supra note 37.
88 Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.IA.A. (Greenshields, Hostie, &
Warren) 1938 (1941).
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from sulfur dioxide fumes originating from a smelter plant in Trail,
British Columbia. The tribunal concluded:
[U] nder the principles of international law, as well as the law of the
United States, no State has the right to use or permit the use of its
territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the
territory of another or properties or persons therein, when the
cause is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear
and convincing evidence.8 9
Trail Smelter is not binding international law; the tribunal was formed
by a specific treaty and applied international and United States law.
The holding is also limited in scope: the tribunal addressed injury
caused by fumes and required clear and convincing evidence of seri-
ous harm. Although Trail Smelter has minimal precedential value in
international law, the decision paved the way for the duty not to cause
transboundary harm declared at the United Nations Conference on
the Human Environment at Stockholm.90
Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration states the duty not to
cause transboundary harm:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to ex-
ploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental poli-
cies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of
other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.91
While Stockholm 21 has traditionally been applied to peacetime trans-
frontier pollution, it should be equally applicable to military actions.
Activities within State control include military attacks. The duty not to
cause transboundary harm, applied to military actions, could be a val-
uable source of environmental protection during war. The content of
Stockholm 21 has been recognized in treaties such as the Law of the
Sea Convention,92 the ASEAN Convention on the Conservation of
Nature and Natural Resources, 93 and the 1979 Geneva Convention
89 Id. at 1965.
90 For other decisions leading up to the declaration of the duty not to cause
transboundary harm at Stockholm, see Glen Plant, Introduction to ENVRoNMENrAL
PROTECTION AND THE LAW OF WAR, supra note 70, at 3, 18 n.51 (1992); ALEXANDRE Kiss
& DxnAH SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL ENVRoNMENTAL LAW, 122-29 (1991).
91 Stockholm Declaration, supra note 13, principle 21.
92 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Oct. 7, 1982, art. 194(2), 21
I.L.M. 1261, 1308 (1982) (stating the duty with respect to pollution).
93 ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources,July
9, 1985, 15 ENvrL. POL'Y & L. 64 (1985).
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on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution.94 More recently, Princi-
ple 21 was adopted in nearly identical form in the Rio Declaration.95
The ICJ in Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons recog-
nized the duty not to cause transboundary harm as international cus-
tomary law. 96 The Court went on to apply (peacetime) environmental
law to armed conflict, balancing the doctrines of respect for the envi-
ronment and self-defense through the well established principles of
necessity and proportionality. The law of armed conflict has tradition-
ally evaluated the legality of military action through these principles
of limitation. In Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons the
Court used traditional principles of limitation to draw a balance be-
tween the right to use force and the duty to respect the environment.
B. Environmental Law and Self-Defense
States must take environmental considerations into account when
assessing what is necessary and proportionate in the pursuit of legiti-
mate military objectives. Respect for the environment is one of the
elements that goes toward assessing whether an action is in conformity
with the principles of necessity and proportionality.97
After recognizing the duty not to cause transboundary harm, the
Court recognized that the environment must be considered when
evaluating necessity and proportionality. At first glance it might ap-
pear that the Court designated environmental concerns as a mere ele-
ment in calculating the legality of military force. The Court's
recognition of the duty not to cause transboundary harm as customary
law and the use of the limiting principles of necessity and proportion-
ality, however, suggest a broader approach.
In recognizing the duty not to cause transboundary harm as cus-
tomary international law, the Court set the stage for the application of
that duty during war. The Court then applied the limiting principles
of necessity and proportionality to draw a balance between the justi-
94 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, Nov. 13, 1979, 34
U.S.T. 3043, 3045, 1302 U.N.T.S. 217, 219. See generally Kiss & SHELTON, supra note
90, at 130, 131.
95 Rio Declaration, supra note 12, principle 2. The Rio Declaration reads "pursu-
ant to their own environmental and developmental policies." Id. (emphasis added).
Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration does not include the words "and develop-
mental." Stockholm Declaration, supra note 13, principle 21.
96 See Kiss & SHELTON, supra note 90, at 130 (arguing that Stockholm 21 is cus-
tomary international law). But see Baker, supra note 69, at 355-56 (arguing that Stock-
holm 21 has not reached customary law status, at least with respect to wartime
application).
97 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 35 I.L.M. 814, 821 (1996).
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fled use of force (in this case self-defense) and respect for the environ-
ment Limiting principles have long been used within the law of
armed conflict to balance the use of force with human rights during
war. Incorporating environmental concerns into the law of armed
conflict, the Court used the traditional principles of limitation to bal-
ance, through necessity and proportionality, the right to self-defense
and environmental protection. Under such an approach, a State
could cause environmental harm in self-defense only to the extent
that the harm is necessary and proportionate to the defensive
measures.
Historically, peacetime environmental law, such as the duty not to
cause transboundary harm, has not been considered when analyzing
the law of armed conflict. The balance struck by the Court is appro-
priate in that it reconciles the independent legal doctrines of self-de-
fense and environmental law. The balance is important because it
signals the growing recognition of environmental considerations
whether during war or peace. The reconciliation through principles
of limitation that was appropriate when the Court considered self-de-
fense and environmental law, however, was inappropriate when the
Court later addressed self-defense and humanitarian law.
IV. HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
A. Background
Humanitarian law is that part of the law of armed conflict that is
concerned with the protection of the victims of armed conflict (all
non-combatants), including civilians.98 Humanitarian law provides
absolute protections in some cases, while in others it balances,
through military necessity, a State's right to use military force with the
human rights of enemy nationals. 99 A number of human rights have
been incorporated into humanitarian law. Several are included in
Protocol I:
The following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and
in any place whatsoever, whether committed by civilian or by mili-
tary agents:
(a) violence to the life, health, or physical or mental well-being
of persons, in particular:
(i) murder;
(ii) torture of all kinds, whether physical or mental;
98 See McCouBREY, supra note 65, at 1.
99 See id. at 198-99. For the proposition that military necessity does not defeat
overriding humanitarian protections but merely acts as a defense to tortious or crimi-
nal liability in certain military situations, see id. at 198.
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(iii) corporal punishment; and
(iv) mutilation;
(b) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating
and degrading treatment, enforced prostitution and any form of in-
decent assault;
(c) the taking of hostages;
(d) collective punishments;
(e) threats to commit any of the foregoing acts.100
Protocol I provides absolute protection for these human rights. 10 1 This
absolute protection stems from the development of the rules of armed
conflict and human lights law over hundreds of years. The absolute
protection that these rights afford stands in tension with the principle
of military necessity, a potential defense to the derogation of some
human rights during war. Geneva law allows no such defense to the
above listed protections. Other rights protected by humanitarian law
can be overriden by military necessity. In prohibiting indiscriminate
attacks on civilians, Protocol I defines indiscriminate as:
[A] n attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civil-
ian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combina-
tion thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated.'
0 2
By this definition of "indiscriminate," the fights of civilians with re-
spect to incidental loss of life are probably derogable in the case of
military necessity.10 3 Similarly, in the prohibition of unnecessary suf-
fering, "the concept of 'unnecessariness' refers not to the suffering
actually endured by the individual, but to suffering which is beyond that
essential for the achievement of the purpose for which it has been inflicted, that
is to say, suffering which goes beyond the mere disabling of the
victim."'
04
100 Protocol I, supra note 10, art. 75(2).
101 "Human rights" is used loosely here to refer to prohibitions of maltreatment
under humanitarian law. Human rights law is formally understood as a field of law
distinct from humanitarian law. While the two overlap, I will address only humanita-
rian law principles. In referring to human rights within humanitarian law, I am refer-
ring to the dictates of humanity found within humanitarian law. For a discussion of
humanitarian law, human rights law, and their interplay, see A.H. Robertson, Humani-
tarian Law and Human Rights, in STUDIES AND ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL HurAurrARA'J
LAW AND RED CROSS PR1NCIPLES, supra note 65, at 793.
102 Protocol I, supra note 10, art. 51(5) (b) (emphasis added).
103 That the right of civilians against indiscriminate attack is made derogable by
the language of Protocol I, art. 51 (5) (b) is not certain. Protocol I, art. 57(5) states:
"No provision of this Article may be construed as authorizing any attacks against the
civilian population, civilians or civilian objects." Id.
104 GREEN, supra note 65, at 89 (emphasis added).
[VOL- 72:41300
19971 COMMENT-THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
In addition to the absolute protection of certain human rights in
humanitarian law treaties, humanitarian law traditionally has involved
voluntary agreement among sovereignties concerning prohibited con-
duct. Historically, sovereignties voluntarily forfeited the right to em-
ploy certain means of warfare, recognizing certain human rights,
proper courses of conduct, and chivalrous codes. Similarly, the signa-
tories to the Hague and Geneva Conventions and Protocols volunta-
rily renounced certain practices in war. These documents have
surpassed exclusive application to signatories in the twentieth century,
becoming part of customary international law.' 05 Where sovereignties
voluntarily have agreed to conduct war without resorting to certain
practices, these practices cannot be justified by military necessity.
States consider military necessity before agreeing to absolutely refrain
from certain courses of conduct in war.'0 6 On the other hand, to the
extent that military necessity exists as an element in the development
of certain humanitarian law principles, such necessity must be recog-
nized and respected as an element of humanitarian law. Thus, hu-
manitarian law covers a broad and well-developed spectrum of rules
relating to war. In balancing the right to use military force against
human rights during war, humanitarian law contains both absolute
rights and derogable rights. The derogable rights alone may yield in
circumstances of military necessity.
In tracing the well-developed codification of the law of armed
conflict, the ICJ in Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons recog-
nized both Hague and Geneva law.10 7 Applying this law to nuclear
weapons, the Court summarized the rules of the Hague and Geneva
law into two cardinal principles: "no civilian targets or indiscriminate
effects," meant to protect civilians; and "no unnecessary suffering,"
meant to protect military personnel.'0 8 By doing so, the Court came
to use the term "humanitarian law" to refer to these principles, having
particular application to military attacks. The Court did not address
the branch of humanitarian law which requires the humane treatment
of war victims, probably reasoning that these rules were inapplicable
to the issue at hand. More importantly, the Court did not factor mili-
tary necessity into its analysis of humanitarian principles.
This Comment next addresses the Court's major holdings in Le-
gality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons. Although the Court
105 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 35 I.L.M. 814, 828 (1996).
See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
106 For a, discussion of humanitarian laws drafted with military necessity in mind,
see Baker, supra note 69, at 360-63.
107 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 35 I.L.M. at 827.
108 See Baker, supra note 69, at 365-66.
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reached several other minor holdings, I will label the two clauses in
paragraph 105(2) (E) 10 9 as the first and second holdings. The Com-
ment addresses the first holding, especially the Court's use of the
modifier "generally" in concluding that the threat or use of nuclear
weapons was generally contrary to humanitarian rules of war. The
Comment also analyzes the Court's failure to consider military neces-
sity in its analysis of humanitarian principles in the first holding. The
Comment then addresses the second holding, analyzing the implica-
tions on humanitarian law when self-defense is treated as external to
humanitarian law.
B. Military Necessity and Humanitarian Principles
Holding One: [T]he threat or use of nuclear weapons would gener-
ally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed
conflict, and in principle the rules of humanitarian law.t10
In separate opinions, three Judges took exception to the use of
the word "generally" in the first holding. These Judges reasoned that
the threat or use of nuclear weapons would violate humanitarian prin-
ciples in all circumstances due to the indiscriminate effects and un-
necessary suffering inherent in nuclear weapon use. The Court's
refusal to state that nuclear weapons conclusively violate humanitarian
principles was, however, consistent with the Court's conception of hu-
manitarian principles. The serious error in the Court's reasoning was
the failure to account for military necessity in its analysis of humanita-
rian law.
1. Tactical Weapons Might Not Violate Humanitarian Principles
The Court first held that the threat or use of nuclear weapons
generally would be contrary to the principles of humanitarian law. In
their dissenting opinions, Judges Weeramantry, Koroma, and
Shahabuddeen took exception to the word "generally" modifying
"contrary to international law.""1 These Judges cited the devastating
effects of nuclear weapons on human life and the environment, in-
cluding the probability of escalation, arguing that the threat or use of
nuclear weapons would always violate the humanitarian principles of
no indiscriminate effects and no unnecessary suffering. The Court's
use of "generally," however, was legitimate in that it accounts for the
uncertainties in predicting the effects of certain nuclear strikes.
109 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 35 I.L.M. at 831.
110 Id.
111 See id. at 881 (dissenting opinion ofJudge Weeramantry); id. at 925 (dissenting
opinion of Judge Koroma); id. at 861 (dissenting opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen).
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Specifically discussed in the opinion were tactical nuclear weap-
ons." 2 While large scale nuclear weapon use would almost certainly
violate humanitarian law concepts,113 low yield nuclear weapons
might be used without indiscriminate effects or unnecessary suffer-
ing,1" 4 Due to the uncertain effects of tactical nuclear weapons in war-
time, including the possibility of escalation, the Court was justified in
using the modifier "generally" when addressing the probability that
nuclear weapons would violate humanitarian law.
Vice President Schwebel introduced an example of a nuclear at-
tack that might fall within the Court's application of humanitarian
principles. In his dissenting opinion, Vice President Schwebel intro-
duced the scenario of a nuclear depth charge launched against an
enemy submarine which is about to fire nuclear missiles. Schwebel
explained that there would be no immediate civilian causalities, thus
no indiscriminate effects. Furthermore, the instant deaths of the sub-
marine's crew would constitute equal or less suffering than death by
fire, drowning, or crushing-more conventional alternatives. Consid-
ering humanity's lack of experience with certain kinds of nuclear
strikes (Vice President Schwebel's scenario, for example), the Court
was justified in allowing for the possibility of a nuclear strike without
indiscriminate effects or unnecessary suffering. The lack of specifics
in the advisory opinion supports the Court's use of the modifier "gen-
erally" in referring to the threat or use of nuclear weapons as contrary
to humanitarian principles.
112 See id. at 829. For discussions on tactical nuclear weapons, see MATTHEW EVAN-
GELISTA, INNOVATION AND THE ARMS RACE: How THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET
UNION DEVELOP NEW MEXLARY TECHNOLOGIES (1988); LAWRENCE FREEDMAN, THE
EVOLUTION OF NUCLEAR STRATEGY (1983); INTERNATIONAL WEAPON DEVELOPMENTS
(4th ed. 1980).
113 For discussions of the effects and destructive capacity of nuclear weapons, see
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nucear Weapons, 35 I.L.M. at 886-95 (dissenting opinion
ofJudge Weeramantry); id. at 863-64 (dissenting opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen);
id. at 925, 928-30 (dissenting opinion of Judge Koroma) (relating testimony by the
mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, THE EF-
FECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR (1983); NAGENDRA SINGH & EDWARD McWHINNEY, NUCLEAR
WEAPONS AND CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAv, 17-27 (1989).
114 One typical example of such a use is a nuclear depth charge deployed to de-
stroy a submarine in an isolated section of the ocean. Another common hypothetical
is a low tonnage nuclear weapon used against a military installation isolated by desert.
In these examples, the immediate indiscriminate effects and unnecessary suffering
are relatively small. The danger of escalation, however, is an uncertainty that could
turn relatively discriminate initial effects into wide reaching harm to human civiliza-
tion. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 35 I.L.M. at 839 (dissenting
opinion of Vice President Schwebel).
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2. The Court Failed to Factor Military Necessity into Humanitarian
Law Analysis
As discussed above, humanitarian law recognizes two forms of
human rights: human rights which cannot be derogated by military
necessity;" 5 and human rights which may give way to necessary mili-
tary force. In considering whether a nuclear attack could be consis-
tent with humanitarian principles, the Court incorrectly analyzed the
humanitarian principles of no indiscriminate effects and no unneces-
sary suffering, both of the second type of humanitarian protection.
The terms "indiscriminate" and "unnecessary" in Protocol I are de-
fined in terms of military necessity." 6 In evaluating the principles of
no indiscriminate effects and no unnecessary suffering, military neces-
sity must be addressed to determine whether the projected military
force is lawful or violative of human rights protections.
The Court, however, did not address military necessity in its anal-
ysis of these principles. Instead of allowing for a measure of inciden-
tal civilian casualties and military suffering in proportion to legitimate
military objectives, the Court addressed whether nuclear weapons
could be used with little or no incidental civilian casualties and little
military suffering, such as the use of tactical nuclear weapons. At no
point in its analysis did the Court include military necessity in its con-
sideration of "no indiscriminate effects" or "no unnecessary suffer-
ing." The Court's failure to balance military force and human rights
through military necessity had little effect on the outcome of its first
holding but a profound effect on the Court's second holding.
C. Self-Defense Doctrine as External to Humanitarian Principles
Holding Two: However, in view of the current state of international
law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot
conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons
115 See Protocol I, supra note 10, art. 75(2).
116 According to Protocol I, an attack is "indiscriminate" only where it causes inci-
dental civilian casualties excessive in relation to the military advantage gained. See
Protocol I, supra note 10, art. 51 (5) (b). Protocol I and the Court, however, recognize
that civilians must not be the object of attack. See id. art. 57(5); Legality of the Threat or
Use of Nuclear Weapons, 35 I.L.M. at 827. This statement is consistent only with the
previous prohibition if read as "civilians may never be the direct object of attack."
Similarly, the principle of no unnecessary suffering defines "unnecessary" in re-
lation to the military objective sought. See GREEN, supra note 65, at 89. "[T]he con-
cept of 'unnecessariness' refers not to the suffering actually endured by the
individual, but to suffering which is beyond that essential for the achievement of the
purpose for which it has been inflicted, that is to say, suffering which goes beyond the
mere disabling of the victim." Id,
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would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-de-
fence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake.
117
The second major holding introduced extreme self-defense. The
Court stated that it could not conclude definitively on the lawfulness
of the threat or use of nuclear weapons in an extreme circumstance of
self-defense. This non-statement raises questions about the applica-
tion of humanitarian law. Self-defense is a form of military force.
Under humanitarian law, such force is constrained by military neces-
sity in order to maintain the balance between military force and
human rights protections. As in its analysis in arriving at its first hold-
ing, the Court did not apply such a balance in the case of extreme self-
defense. Rather, the Court removed extreme self-defense from hu-
manitarian law, analyzing extreme self-defense as a doctrine in-
dependent of humanitarian law.
That the Court analyzed self-defense as independent of humani-
tarian law was evident in the Court's reasoning." 8 First, as in the anal-
ysis leading to its first holding, the Court did not factor military
necessity into its examination of extreme self-defense. Second, the
Court declared the light to extreme self-defense to be fundamental.
"[T]he Court cannot lose sight of the fundamental right of every State
to survival, and thus its right to self-defence.., when its survival is at
stake." 1 9 Third, the Court stated that it considered not merely hu-
manitarian law, but "the present state of international law viewed as a
whole."120 In analyzing extreme self-defense, the Court did not recog-
nize self-defense as a form of military force, subject to the limitations
of humanitarian law. Rather, the Court departed from the humanita-
rian principles of Hague and Geneva law and analyzed self-defense as
a separate doctrine under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.
The Court stated that it could not conclude whether extreme self-
defense could justify the use of nuclear weapons. In making this non-
117 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 35 I.L.M. at 831. "Extreme self-
defense" is used in the Comment to refer to "an extreme circumstance of self-de-
fence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake." Id.
118 Two judges, in their separate opinions, found the Court's inclusion of its ex-
treme self-defense holding in paragraph 105(2) (E) confusing. That paragraph ad-
dressed humanitarian law. Judges Herczegh and Ranjeva thought that the extreme
self-defense holding would have been more appropriately included in paragraph
105(2) (C), the paragraph addressing self-defense under Article 51. See id. at 1348
(separate opinion of Judge Herczegh); id. at 1357 (separate opinion of Judge
Ranjeva). This confusion resulted because the Court removed self-defense from its
humanitarian law analysis, yet retained the extreme self-defense holding in the para-
graph dedicated to humanitarian law.
119 Id. at 830 (emphasis added).
120 Id. (emphasis added).
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conclusive statement, the Court recognized that the effects of nuclear
weapon use in the modem world were not known. By merely raising
the issue, however, the Court suggested that nuclear weapon use
might be justified by self-defense. In light of the Court's treatment of
self-defense as external to humanitarian law, the legality of a nuclear
attack in self-defense would depend upon reconciling independent
legal doctrines: human rights protections and the "fundamental right
of every State to survival, and thus its right to self defense."
121
Judge Fleischhauer in his separate opinion attempted such a rec-
onciliation.12 2 Judge Fleischhauer reasoned that human rights and
self-defense were irreconcilable in the case of nuclear weapons. He
adopted a least common denominator approach as a means of evalu-
ating the legal principles which he considered to be of "equal rank-
ing."12 3 Like the Court, Fleischhauer treated self-defense as external
to humanitarian law. But the Court, unlike Fleischhauer, did not at-
tempt to reconcile the two doctrines. 124 When the Court failed to rec-
oncile the doctrines, it undercut certain human rights protections.
121 Id.
122 Judge Fleischhauer evaluated "[t]he Principles and rules of humanitarian law
and the other principles of law applicable in armed conflict such as... the inherent
right of self-defense." Id. at 835.
123 Id Fleischhauer proposed an alternative explanation in the absence of a rule
for the conciliation of conflicting legal principles, "the general principles of law rec-
ognized in all legal systems, contains a principle to the effect that no legal system is
entitled to demand the self-abandonment, the suicide, of one of its subjects." Id.
While, this in fact, may be the case, one may find a similar (perhaps inherent) princi-
ple stating that a legal system cannot be interpreted to allow the destruction of the
society that created the system, in this case mankind. In his dissent, Judge Weeraman-
try quoted H.L.A. Hart. "We are committed to it as something presupposed by the
terms of the discussion; for our concem is with social arrangements for continued
existence, not with those of a suicide club." Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weap-
ons, 35 I.L.M. at 912 (dissenting opinion of Judge Weeramantry) (quoting H.L.A.
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 188 (1961)); see also id. at 863 (dissenting opinion of
Judge Shahabuddeen). While a legal system should not require the suicide of one of
its members, it should also not require the suicide of all of its members; a likely result
considering the devastating effects of nuclear weapons and possibility of escalation.
124 In his separate opinion, President Bedjaoui recognized a States' right to sur-
vival as fundamental. Analyzing self-defense as external to humanitarian law,
Bedjaoui did not try to reconcile the doctrines. Bedjaoui recognized that "self-de-
fense-if exercised in extreme circumstances in which the very survival of a State is in
question-cannot engender a situation in which a State would exonerate itself from
compliance with the 'intransgressible' norms of international humanitarian law." Id.
at 1347 (separate opinion ofJudge Bedjaoui). Such a recognition safeguards absolute
humanitarian law protections even where self-defense is analyzed outside of humani-
tarian law. The opinion of the Court made no such recognition.
13o6 (VOL. 72:4
1997] COMMENT-THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
D. Implications
Humanitarian law covers a broad spectrum of rules and princi-
ples. By the principle of military necessity, it balances States' right to
self-defense and human rights of the enemy in the case of certain der-
ogable human rights. Absolute human rights protections are not sub-
ject to such a balance in humanitarian law. When self-defense is
removed from humanitarian law, the dichotomy of humanitarian law
protection is lost. Instead of considering and rejecting military neces-
sity within humanitarian law,125 such externalization pits two legal
doctrines against each other. The result is that where the doctrines
are irreconcilable, attempts will be made to reconcile them (such as
Fleischhauer's least common denominator approach).
For example, if a prisoner of war possessed information that
would prevent the destruction of the captor State, the State could ar-
gue that torture of that prisoner was justified in the extreme case of
self-defense. 12 6 Humanitarian law contains an absolute prohibition
on torture.127 When self-defense is analyzed externally to humanita-
rian law, however, the legality of the torture (self-defense) would turn
on principles of necessity and proportionality,128 with the likely result
being legality. Similarly, such reasoning could justify the taking of
hostages by a State as a self-defense measure to prevent military attack.
Protocol I and customary international law clearly would not allow
such an action. 129 The accordance of absolute protection to certain
human rights disappears where humanitarian law and self-defense are
analyzed as independent legal doctrines. The externalization of self-
defense would not affect humanitarian principles such as "no indis-
criminate effects" and "no unnecessary suffering" since both humani-
tarian law and Article 51 would limit these protections through
(military) necessity. The absolute protections of humanitarian law,
however, become limited when self-defense is removed from humani-
tarian law.'3 0 A proper interpretation of humanitarian law would not
125 Such necessity has been considered and rejected as reflected by the absolute
nature of the prohibitions.
126 For a list of actions that States' have claimed as self-defense, see Legality of the
Threat or Use of Nudear Weapons, 35 I.L.M. at 1357 (separate opinion ofJudge Ranjeva).
127 See Protocol I, supra note 10, principle 75(2) (a) (ii).
128 As required by U.N. CHAaER, art. 51. See supra note 40 and accompanying
text.
129 See Protocol I, supra note 10, principle 75(2) (c).
130 The Court, in its second holding, considered a defensive nuclear strike in the
face of a State's destruction-extreme self-defense. The Court recognized a fumda-
mental right to self-defense stemming from the right to survival. Perhaps the Court
arrived at such a point by imagining a situation in which nuclear weapon use could
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erode such human rights protections: military necessity within human-
itarian law operates as a defense to the derogation of certain protec-
tions but not of others.
V. CONCLUSION
The Court's opinion in Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weap-
ons has implications for environmental and humanitarian law. The
duty not to cause transboundary harm is clearly stated by the Court to
be part of international law. The Court's recognition of environmen-
tal concerns as a factor in necessity and proportionality analysis con-
tinues the trend towards recognizing the importance of
environmental issues in the law of armed conflict. The Court appro-
priately balanced the independent legal doctrines of respect for the
environment and self defense through the limiting principles of ne-
cessity and proportionality.
The Court erroneously opened the door for a similar balancing
approach when it failed to recognize that humanitarian principles
and self-defense are not independent legal doctrines. The Court's
omission of self-defense analysis within its consideration of humanita-
rian law supports the Court's recognition of self-defense as independ-
ent to humanitarian law. Where self-defense-a common theme in
war-conflicts with human rights of soldiers, civilians, and war victims,
the result of removing self-defense analysis from humanitarian law
could mean the end of absolute humanitarian protections during war.
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meet Article 51 requirements of necessity and proportionality. In recognizing self-
defense as external to humanitarian law, however, the Court opened the door for the
erosion of humanitarian law protections in cases of conventional self-defense, as ana-
lyzed outside the confines of humanitarian law. Judge Ranjeva, in his separate opin-
ion noted that:
[n] either the legal precedents of the Court or of any other jurisdiction nor
the doctrine offer any authority to confirm the existence of a distinction
between the general case of application of the rules of the law of armed
conflict and the exceptional case [such as extreme self-defense] exempting a
belligerent from fulfilling the obligations imposed by those rules.
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 35 I.L.M. at 1357 (separate opinion of
Judge Ranjeva).
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